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Abstract
In this paper, we present a systematic overview of different endogenous optimization-based characteristic
functions and discuss their properties. Furthermore, we define and analyze in detail a new, η-characteristic
function. This characteristic function has a substantial advantage over other characteristic functions in
that it can be obtained with a minimal computational effort and has a reasonable economic interpretation.
In particular, the new characteristic function can be seen as a reduced version of the classical Neumann-
Morgenstern characteristic function, where the players both from the coalition and from the complementary
coalition use their previously computed strategies instead of solving respective optimization problems. Our
finding are illustrated by a pollution control game with n non-identical players. For the considered game,
we compute all characteristic functions and compare their properties. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that
both the characteristic functions and the resulting cooperative solutions satisfy some symmetry relations.
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1. Introduction
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the notion of a characteristic function plays a central role in
cooperative game theory. The characteristic function describes the worth of a coalition and hence is used in
coalition formation, [9, 15]: two groups of players (i.e., smaller coalitions) are likely to join to form a larger
coalition if the characteristic function of the larger coalition is greater than the sum of the characteristic
functions of the original coalitions. On the other hand, an importance of an individual player within a
coalition can be measured by its marginal contribution to the characteristic function. This is the idea upon
which the computation of the Shapley value [29, 31], the Banzhaf power index and other extensions of the
Shapley value are based, [27].
Since the seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern, [30], there has been active and continuing
research on the role and different forms of characteristic functions. In general, there are two main approaches
to defining a characteristic function: an endogenous and an exogenous one. The former approach derives
the value of the characteristic function from the properties and the structure of the game alone, while
the latter makes use of some external information (see, e.g., [6], where the external data of trade flows
was used). However, it is in general rather difficult to formalize exogenous effects. Therefore we stay
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with the endogenous formulation, which in turn can be subdivided into two classes: equilibrium- and
optimization-based characteristic functions. While the former ones are obtained as equilibrium solutions in
a non-cooperative game played between the coalition and the rest of the players (which can form a coalition
as well or can play individually), the latter ones are obtained under the assumption that both the coalition
and the remaining players a priori make certain decisions about their strategies and follow them. As an
example of an equilibrium-based characteristic function we mention the γ-characteristic function introduced
in [5].
Admittedly, equilibrium-based characteristic functions are more realistic from economic viewpoint and
can be justified from the viewpoint of players’ rational behavior. However, they have a serious drawback that
solving a Nash equilibrium problem is in general much more complicated compared to solving an optimization
problem. Another problem is that even for relatively innocent problem formulation there is a chance that
the Nash equilibrium will be non-unique, which presents an additional difficulty – especially in the context
of equilibrium-based characteristic functions – as there can appear many incomparable Nash equilibria (see
a discussion in [23]). We thus confine ourselves to studying only optimization-based characteristic functions.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: first, we wish to present a systematic overview of different
endogenous optimization-based characteristic functions (i.e., α, β, δ, and ζ - c.f.) and discuss their properties.
Second, we present and analyze in detail a new characteristic function, termed the η-characteristic function.
This characteristic function has a substantial advantage over other characteristic functions in that it can be
obtained with a minimal computational effort and has a reasonable economic interpretation. In particular,
we show that the new characteristic function can be seen as a reduced version of the classical Neumann-
Morgenstern characteristic function, where the players both from the coalition and from the complementary
coalition use their previously computed strategies instead of solving respective optimization problems.
As an illustration we consider a game of pollution control with n non-identical players. For the considered
game, we compute all characteristic functions and compare their properties. Quite surprisingly, it turns
out that both the characteristic functions and the resulting cooperative solutions satisfy some symmetry
relations. While this result does not need to hold in general, it shows that there is a certain interconnection
between different types of charateristic functions that is yet to be studied.
This paper extends and generalizes a number of results scattered through the series of works by the first
author, [14, 12, 13]. See also [25, 28] for related results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce a number of basic facts and definitions
from game theory. Section 3 contains an extensive analysis and comparison of a number of characteristic
functions, while in Section 4, the described results are illustrated with a differential game of n players. In
particular, it is shown that for the considered example the ζ characteristic function possesses a number of
additional properties of particular interest. Finally, a number of conclusions and directions for the future
work are presented in the Conclusion section. All technical results as well as the proofs of the theorems are
collected in two Appendices.
2. Basic definitions
2.1. Differential games in normal form
We consider an n-person differential game Γ(x0, t0, T ) that starts from the initial state x0 at time t0 and
evolves over the interval [t0, T ]. The dynamics of the game are described by the system
x˙ = f(x, u1, . . . , un), x(t0) = x0, (1)
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where x(t) ∈ X , ui(t) ∈ Ui, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ]; X and Ui are compact subsets of Rn and Rni , respectively. We
denote by Ui the set of admissible controls (actions) of the ith player, it can be the set of all measurable
or piecewise continuous functions on the interval [t0, T ] with values in Ui. In the following, we will employ
the short notations u(t) and U for (u1(·), . . . , un(·)) and (U1, . . . ,Un), respectively. We assume that for any
n-tuple of admissible controls u(t) ∈ U , the solution to (1) exists, unique and is defined over the whole
interval [t0, T ].
Let the set of the players be denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. We define the payoff of the ith player as
Ji(t0, x0, u) =
T∫
t0
hi(τ, x(τ), u(τ))dτ, (2)
where hi(τ, x, u) is a smooth function and x(t) is the solution of (1) for controls u(t). In the rest of the
paper, we will write Ji(x0, u) keeping in mind that the game is played on the interval [t0, T ].
2.2. Solution concepts
We will consider two most typical definitions of the solution of a differential game: a Nash equilibrium
and a cooperative agreement.
Definition 2.1. The n-tuple uNE = {uNE1 , . . . , u
NE
n } is a Nash equilibrium if for every i ∈ N
Ji(t0, x0, u
NE) ≥ Ji(t0, x0, u¯i, u
NE
−i ) ∀ui ∈ Ui
where uNE−i = {u
NE
1 , . . . , u
NE
i−1 , u
NE
i+1 , . . . , u
NE
n }.
Definition 2.2. A cooperative agreement is a tuple u∗(t) = (u∗1(t), . . . , u
∗
n(t)) s.t.
n∑
i=1
Ji(x0, u
∗) ≥
n∑
i=1
Ji(x0, u) ∀u ∈ U .
We assume that both the Nash equilibrium and the cooperative agreement exist and unique. While this
may not be true in general, this holds for a sufficiently large class of practically relevant cases, see, e.g., [1, 7].
It should be noted that computing a Nash equilibrium is a substantially more complicated task compared
to that of computing the cooperative agreement: while the latter boils down to solving a single optimization
problem, the former requires solving n coupled optimization problems.
The Nash equilibrium and the cooperative agreement represent two extreme cases in the range of all
possible strategic interactions between the players: the former correspond to the case when all players act
individually while the latter implies that all the players have agreed to cooperate in order to maximize their
joint payoff, i.e., they form a grand coalition. In many applications, there is a need to compare different
strategic decisions. This issue is addressed using the notion of the characteristic function as described below.
3. Classes of characteristic functions in differential games
3.1. Definition of a characteristic function
We define the coalition S to be a subset of the set of all players N , i.e., S ⊆ N or, using set-theoretic
notation, S ∈ 2N . Furthermore, we will call N \ S the coalition complementary to S.
Definition 3.1. Given a differential game Γ(x0, t0), a characteristic function is defined as the map V :
R×X × 2N → R≥0 that satisfies two conditions:
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1. V (x0, t0, ∅) = 0;
2. V (x0, t0, N) =
∑n
i=1 Ji(t0, x0, u
∗).
We stress the fact that a characteristic function depends on the initial conditions and hence can be
extended to subgames. However, for the sake of brevity we will drop the first two arguments and write a
characteristic function as V (S). Later, when considering a real example in Sec. 4 we will recover the original
notation.
There is a third condition that until recently was considered as an essential component of the definition
of the characteristic function. Nowadays it is considered merely as a property of a characteristic function.
Definition 3.2. A characteristic function V is said to be super-additive if for any two disjoint coalitions
S,Q ⊆ N , S ∩Q = ∅, it holds that
V (S) + V (Q) ≤ V (S ∪Q).
The value V (S) is typically interpreted as the worth or the power of the coalition S. Thus super-additivity
implies that the power of the union of any two disjoint coalitions is not less than the sum of the powers of
individual coalitions. Suppose that two coalitions merge if the characteristic function of the joint coalition
exceeds the sum of the characteristic functions of the individual coalitions. In this sense, the super-additivity
property of a characteristic function formalizes an incentive for the players to form ever bigger coalitions
and serves as a foundation for the study of coalition formation, see [9, 15].
Another major field of application of characteristic function consists in determining a rule for sharing
the total payoff obtained under the cooperative agreement1. This rule is called an imputation.
Definition 3.3. A vector ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) is an imputation if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Individual rationality condition: ξi ≥ V ({i}) for all i = 1, . . . , n;
2. Group rationality condition:
∑n
i=1 ξi = V (N).
Obviously, the set of imputations is never empty as V (N) ≥
∑n
i=1 V ({i}). In general, it can be defined
as an (n+ 1) simplex formed by n vectors
Ξk =

V ({1}) , . . . V (N)−

 n∑
i=1
i6=k
V ({i})

 , . . . V ({n})

 , k = 1, . . . , n.
However, if the Nash equilibrium turns out to be Pareto optimal, as in the case of Strong Nash Equilibrium,
the set of imputations reduces to a trivial solution Ξo =
(
V ({1}) . . . V ({n})
)
. If, furthermore, the
characteristic function is merely additive, but not superadditive, we have an inessential game, i.e., the game
in which neither player can profit from forming a coalition.
The main subject of cooperative game theory consists in determining a subset of imputations satisfying
certain properties and devising a rule to choose between them. These subsets are called the cooperative so-
lutions (see, e.g., [22, Ch. 13-14] for a description of different concepts of cooperative solution). Remarkably,
most cooperative solutions except for the proportional one [21] are based upon the use of a characteristic
function.
1Obviously, the main prerequisite for using imputations is the condition that the players agree to redistribute their payoffs.
The games for which this condition is fulfilled are called the games with transferable utility (TU games).
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One particularly important type of cooperative solution is the classical Shapley value, [16]. This is a
single valued cooperative solution that is defined as
Shi =
∑
S⊂N,
i∈S
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
[
V (S)− V (S \ {i})
]
. (3)
In the following, we will define characteristic functions as an outcome of the strategic interaction between
players. Namely, the players for the coalition S and its complementary coalition N \S choose to use certain
strategies. The characteristic function is thus defined as the value of the total payoff of the players from
S. Loosely speaking, a characteristic function can be seen as a score table in a tournament in which each
coalition plays again its complement following a predetermined set of rules. Obviously, these competitions
never occur in real life and do not aim at reflecting any realistic scenario of the interactions between the
players. Therefore, the exact choice of the rules adopted in a particular tournament is in principle not
substantial. However, it turns out that for certain sets of rules the characteristic function is easier to
compute or possesses some advantageous properties. Below, we consider different approaches to compute a
characteristic function and make a comparison.
3.2. Types of characteristic functions
3.2.1. α- and β-characteristic functions (Neumann-Morgenstern)
The first and by far the most popular method for characteristic function construction was introduced in
the seminal work [30], and now is referred to as the α-characteristic function. The characteristic function
is defined as the lower value of the zero-sum game ΓS,N\S between the coalition S acting as the first,
maximizing player and the complementary coalition N \ S acting as the second, minimizing player:
V α(S) =
{
0, S = ∅,
val− ΓS,N\S, S ⊆ N,
(4)
where the lower value of the game is defined by
val−ΓS,N\S = sup
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
inf
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)).
Here we assume that the players from the complementary coalition know the strategies adopted by the players
from S. Put differently, the players from the complementary coalition use their best response strategies that
are defined on the union
⋃
i∈S Ui. In the rest of the paper we will assume that the lower and upper bounds in
the respective optimization problems belong to the admissible control sets and hence we can write val−ΓS,N\S
in terms of minima and maxima:
val−ΓS,N\S = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)). (5)
The characteristic function V α(S) is interpreted as the maximum guaranteed payoff that the coalition S can
secure in the worst case. Under sufficiently mild conditions, the lower value of the game is uniquely defined
as the viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellaman-Isaacs equation (see [8] for details; an
extensive and systematic treatment of the problem is given in [3]). The described max-min optimization
problems can be solved in the class of open-loop controls as well [2, Sec. 6.5]. Note that computation of
the α-characteristic function requires solving 2n− 1 optimization problems (5), which is a rather demanding
task. An example of constructing the α-characteristic function can be found in [20].
On the other hand, the α-characteristic function has certain important advantages. In particular, we
have the following result.
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Theorem 3.1 ([24]). The α-characteristic function for the game Γ(x0, t0, T ) is superadditive, i.e., for any
S,Q ∈ 2N , S ∩Q = ∅ we have
V α(S ∪Q) ≥ V α(S) + V α(Q). (6)
Since the proof of this result for differential games is not readily available, we present it in Appendix 1.
An alternative option is the β-characteristic function which is defined as the upper value of the game:
V β(S) =


0, S = ∅,
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, ui(uj), uj), S ⊆ N.
(7)
This characteristic function can be seen as the smallest payoff that a complementary coalition can securely
force the coalition S to receive. Obviously, V β(S) ≥ V α(S) for all S ⊆ N .
It has been argued, e.g., in [5, 23], that the use of the α- (and also β-) characteristic function is not
justified from the economic point of view. Namely, it is quite unlikely that the members of the complementary
coalition would act with the sole objective of minimizing the payoff of the coalition S. Despite the fact that
– as was discussed at the end of Sec. 3.1 – a characteristic function does not reflect any real strategic
interaction between players, this argument has a point. When using a characteristic function as a measure
of the coalition’s power it is desirable to measure that power according to some realistic scenario.
3.2.2. δ-characteristic function
An alternative approach to the construction of a characteristic function, termed the δ-characteristic
function was proposed in [23]. The calculation of a δ-characteristic function consists of two steps. First, the
Nash equilibrium strategies uNE are computed. Next, the characteristic function is computed by letting the
players from S maximize their total payoff
∑
i∈S Ji(t0, x0, u) while the players from N \S use the previously
computed Nash equilibrium strategies:
V δ(S) =


0, S = ∅,
max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, uS, u
NE
N\S), S ⊆ N,
(8)
where uS = {ui}i∈S and u
NE
N\S = {u
NE
j }j∈N\S .
Computation of the δ-characteristic function requires computing the Nash equilibrium for the game
Γ(x0, t0, T ) and solving 2
n − n− 1 optimization problems. Note that by definition V δ({i}) = uNEi for any
i ∈ N . Determining the value of the δ-characteristic function for any other coalition consists in solving an
optimization problem with the controls of the players from the complementary coalition being fixed to their
Nash equilibrium values. Such optimization problems may or may not present a challenge depending on
whether the Nash equilibrium solution can be found analytically or not.
In contrast to the α-characteristic function, the δ-characteristic function has a neat economical inter-
pretation. When confronted with an emerging coalition S, the players from the complement N \ S, i.e.,
those not involved in forming the coalition remain neutral and stay committed to their Nash equilibrium
strategies. Perhaps the most realistic scenario would be to consider the situation when the value of the
characteristic function was computed as the Nash equilibrium value in a game played between the coalition
acting as a single player and the remaining players acting independently (cf. the γ-characteristic function
described in [5], see also [18] for a similar approach applied to partition games). However, this would require
solving 2n−n eqiulibrium problems which is a substantially more difficult task compared to those described
above.
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In [26] it was proved that the δ-characterisctic function is superadditive for a certain class of static games
if some conditions on the payoff function are fulfilled. However, in a general case the δ-characteristic function
can turn out to be not superadditive as the recent result shows [12].
3.2.3. ζ-characteristic function
The ζ-characteristic function was initially proposed in [25] and later developed in [14]. Its construction
is carried out in two steps. First, the cooperative agreement u∗ in the game Γ(x0, t0, T ) is computed. Next,
when computing V ζ(S), the players from the coalition S use their optimal cooperative strategies u∗S while
the players from N \ S use the strategies minimizing the total payoff of the players from S:
V ζ(S) =


0, S = ∅,
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S, uN\S), S ⊆ N.
(9)
This characteristic function can be seen as a reduced version of the α-characteristic function in which
the players from the coalition S do not attempt to maximize their joint payoff, but rather stick to their
previously computed cooperative solution while the left-out players play against them. In some sense, this
situation can be interpreted as a breakup of the grand coalition in which the split-off players play against
the rest.
Similarly to the α-characteristic function, computation of the ζ-characteristic function requires solving
2n − 1 optimization problems, albeit with less decision variables. However, whether this results in a simpli-
fication of the problem depends on whether the sooperative agreement can be obtained analytically or not.
Similarly to the α-characteristic function, V ζ(S) is superadditve.
Theorem 3.2 ([14]). The ζ-characteristic function for the game Γ(x0, t0, T ) is superadditive, i.e., for any
S,Q ∈ 2N , S ∩Q = ∅ we have
V ζ(S ∪Q) ≥ V ζ(S) + V ζ(Q). (10)
See Appendix 1 for the proof.
Lastly, ζ-characteristic function is applicable for games with fixed coalition structures [25].
3.2.4. η-characteristic function
Most recently, a new characteristic function was introduced in [13]. Following the established tradition,
we term it the η-characteristic function. It is defined by
V η(S) =


0, S = ∅,∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S , u
NE
N\S), S ⊆ N.
(11)
This characteristic function has a number of advantages. First, it is computed using only the cooperative
agreement and the Nash eqilibria. This substantially simplifies the problem, especially if the number of
players is sufficiently large.
Furthermore, the new characteristic function has a pretty intuitive interpretation. In contrast to the
δ-characteristic functions (and similar to the ζ-characteristic function) it describes the process of the grand
coalition’s breakup. However, as the players split off the coalition, their complement do not act agains them,
but rather choose to use Nash equilibrium strategies, which seems to be more realistic.
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The η-characteristic function is not superadditive in general. However, we can construct a superadditive
extension of the V η-characteristic function
V¯ η(S) = max
{∑
k
V η(Qk)
∣∣{Qk}k=1,...,l s.t. ⋃
k
Qk = S,Qi
⋂
Qj = ∅, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ l
}
,
where the maximum is taken over all partitions of the set S. Note that for a superadditive function we have
V¯ (S) = V (S) for all S ⊆ N .
3.3. Partial order relations on the set of characteristic functions
For the introduced characteristic functions, a partial order relation can be defined. Before presenting
the result we note that by definition, all characteristic functions have equal values for the empty coalition
and for the grand coalition. We have the following result.
Theorem 3.3. For the differential game Γ(x0, t0, T ) and for any S ∈ 2N the following inequalities hold:
1. V α(S) ≥ V ζ(S).
2. V δ(S) ≥ V α(S).
3. V δ(S) ≥ V β(S)
4. V δ(S) ≥ V η(S).
5. V η(S) ≥ V ζ(S)
The proof is given in Appendix 1. The results of Theorem 3.3 can be represented by a diagram as
shown in Fig. 1. An arrow corresponds to the “greater or equal” relation. Note that we added an arrow
corresponding to the V β(S) ≥ V ζ(S) inequality that immediately follows from the transitivity of the ≥
relation.
V δ
V α
V η
V ζ
V β
Figure 1: Partial order diagram
3.4. Analysis and discussion of characteristic functions
Before we proceed to a further analysis of characteristic functions it is worth reiterating on the com-
putational advantages provided by the η-characteristic function. In Table 1, we present a summary of the
computational effort required for constructing different characteristic functions. We show the number of opti-
mization problems to be solved and the number of variables involved. It can be seen that the η-characteristic
function has a tremendous advantage in terms of computation power required. This is particularly important
when considering realistic games in which the number of players is expressed by several-digit numbers.
The described characteristic functions do not exhaust all possible variants of the strategic interaction
between players. In Table 2 we describe all meaningful characteristic functions that involve at most one
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Table 1: Computational effort required for computing different characteristic functions.
C.F. # of optimization problems
(# of variables)
# of Nash equilibrium
problems
α (β) 2n − 1 (n) 0
δ 2n − n− 1 (2÷ n) 1
ζ 2n − 1 (1 ÷ n) 0
η 1 (n) 1
computation of the equilibrium. That is to say, we exclude the cases where the characteristic functions are
obtained as the Nash equilibria in which either the coalition or the complementary coalition play as a single
player (for instance, the γ-characteristic function [5]). Furthermore, by meaningful we mean that, e.g., the
members of the coalition S do not attempt to minimize their total payoff and so on.
Table 2: Possible strategic interactions between the coalition S and its complement N \ S and the respective characteristic
functions.
S
max
ui∈Ui
i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ji ui = u
NE
i , i ∈ S ui = u
∗
i , i ∈ S
min
uj∈Uj
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji α/β F1 ζ
N \ S uj = uNEj , j ∈ N \ S δ
Nash
equilibrium
η
uj = u
∗
j , j ∈ N \ S F2 F3
Cooperative
agreement
There are three more characteristic functions that can be split in two groups (with a single overlap):
when the members of S use their Nash equilibrium strategies (F1 and F3) and when the members of the
complementary coalition use their cooperative strategies (F2 and F3). Both cases are pretty unrealistic
because they correspond to the scenarios where the players make an inappropriate use of their strategies.
That is to say, a coalition S is supposed to either maximize its total payoff or stick to previously computed
cooperative agreement, while the complementary coalition either plays against S by minimizing its payoff or
remains neutral by sticking to the previously computed Nash equilibrium solution. In contrast to that, the
characteristic functions F1, F2, F3 correspond to the cases where at least one coalition takes an irrational
decision. Thus we dismiss the respective cases as non-relevant.
We observe that the δ and the ζ functions form the lower and the upper bound for the considered
characteristic functions. When considering any other characteristic function one might ask how much does
it deviates for the respective bounds. Thus for each characteristic function V x, x ∈ {α, β, δ, ζ, η} we introduce
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the functions V
x
(S) and V x that are defined as follows:
V
x
(S) = V δ(S)− V x(S),
V x(S) = V x(S)− V ζ(S).
(12)
Functions V
x
(S) and V x describe the distance of the characteristic function to the upper, respectively lower
bound. Both functions are non-negative and it holds that V
δ
(S) = V ζ = 0.
Furthermore, we say that a characteristic function V x(S) is aligned with the bounds if there exists a
function k(S) : S 7→ [0, 1], called the alignement coefficient, such that
V x(S) = kx(S)V
δ(S) + (1 − kx(S))V
ζ(S) ∀S ⊆ N.
In the following paragraph compute the whole range of characteristic functions for a particular n-players
differential game and analyze their properties.
4. Illustration. Differential game of pollution control for n players
4.1. The model of the game
We consider a differential game of pollution control with prescribed duration based upon the model
described in [17, 4], see also [11]. In contrast to the mentioned results, we consider a general setup involving
n non-identical players (countries, companies).
Let N , |N | = n, denote the set of all players and x(t) be the total pollution at time t. Its dynamics are
governed by the differential equation
x˙(t) =
n∑
i=1
ui(t), x(t0) = x0 ≥ 0, (13)
where ui(t) is the pollution flow emitted by the ith player. We assume that each player sets an upper bound
on the pollution flow, i.e., ui(t) ∈ [0, bi]. The ith player’s revenue is approximated by a strictly concave
function of the pollution flow: Ri(ui(t)) = biui −
1
2u
2
i . Note that Ri(ui) attains its maximum at the upper
bound ui = bi. Furthermore, there is a cost associated with pollution that the player has to pay (taxes,
environmental costs etc). This cost is assumed to be a linear function of the pollution stock, albeit with the
coefficient that is specific for each player: Qi(x) = −dix, di > 0.
Thus, the ith player’s payoff is given by
Ji(x0, u) =
∫ T
t0
(
biui −
1
2
u2i − dix
)
dt. (14)
Assume that for all i = 1, . . . , n, the following regularity constraints are satisfied:
bi ≥ DN (T − t0), (15)
where DN =
n∑
i=1
di.
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4.2. Solutions of the game
We start by computing the Nash equilibrium solution and the cooperative agreement. We will stick to
the open-loop solutions and will thus employ the Pontryagin maximum principle [19]. However, for the
problem under study the solution can be obtained within the class of feedback strategies, see, e.g., [10, Sec.
6]. The Nash equilibrium is found to be
uNE(t) =
[
b1 − d1(T − t), b2 − d2(T − t) ... bn − dn(T − t)
]
, (16)
while the cooperative agreement is given by
u∗(t) =
[
b1 −DN (T − t), b2 −DN (T − t) ... bn −DN (T − t)
]
. (17)
The corresponding trajectories are
xNE(t) = x0 + (BN −DNT )(t− t0) +
DN
2
(t2 − t20) (18)
and
x∗(t) = x0 + (BN − nDNT )(t− t0) +
nDN
2
(t2 − t20), (19)
where BN =
∑n
i=1 bi. The derivation of (16)-(19) is quite straightforward and therefore omitted.
We note that
xNE(t)− x∗(t) =
1
2
(n− 1)DN (t− t0)(2T − t− t0)) ≥ 0, t ∈ [t0, T ].
This has the straightforward interpretation that the level of pollution is smaller when the players agree to
cooperate.
4.3. Analytic expressions for the characteristic functions
In this subsection we present analytic expressions for the previously considered characteristic functions
in the pollution control game. Note that we write the characteristic functions in a slightly more general
form, as functions of the coalition S, the initial state x(t) and the initial time t ≤ T . This form can be useful
when we consider the characteristic functions of the subgames. At the same time, we can easily recover the
total characteristic function of the game by setting t and x(t) to t0 and x(t0), respectively.
Thus, for a coalition S ∈ 2N we have the following expressions for the characteristic functions (see
Appendix 2 for the details on the derivation of the characteristic functions):
V α(S, x(t), t) = −DS(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
B˜S(T − t)−
1
2
BNDS(T − t)
2 +
1
6
sD2S(T − t)
3, (20)
V δ(S, x(t), t) = −DS(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
B˜S(T − t)−
1
2
BNDS(T − t)
2 +
1
6
(2DN\SDS + sD
2
S)(T − t)
3, (21)
V ζ(S, x(t), t) = −DS(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
B˜S(T − t)−
1
2
BNDS(T − t)
2 −
1
6
sDN (DN − 2DS)(T − t)
3, (22)
and, finally,
V η(S, x(t), t) =
−DS(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
B˜S(T − t)−
1
2
BNDS(T − t)
2 +
1
6
(2sDNDS + 2DN\SDS − sD
2
N )(T − t)
3. (23)
Here we used the following notation: BQ =
∑
i∈Q bi, B˜Q =
∑
i∈Q b
2
i , and DQ =
∑
i∈Q di, where Q ⊆ N . It
turns out that in this particular case, the computed characteristic function is superadditive.
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Proposition 4.1. The characteristic function (23) is superadditive, i.e.,
V η(S1 ∪ S2, x(t), t) ≥ V
η(S1, x(t), t) + V
η(S2, x(t), t), S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be two disjoint subsets of N . We have
V η(S1 ∪ S2)− V
η(S1)− V
η(S2) =
=
1
6
(
2DNDS2s1 + 2DNDS1s2 − 2DS2DS1 − 2DS1DS2
)
(T − t)3 >
>
1
6
(
2DNDS2 + 2DNDS1 − 2DS2DS1 − 2DS1DS2
)
(T − t)3 =
=
1
6
(
2DS2DN\S1 + 2DS1DN\S2
)
(T − t)3 > 0,
whence the result follows.
4.4. Analysis and comparison of the obtained characteristic functions
Using the results presented in the previous subsection we can compute further characteristics of the α
and η characteristic functions (12), computed for the game (13), (14).
Proposition 4.2. For the game (13), (14), the distance of the characteristic functions V α and V η to the
respective upper and lower bounds are given by
V
α
=
1
6
sD2N\S(T − t)
3, V α =
1
3
DN\SDS(T − t)
3,
V
η
=
1
3
DN\SDS(T − t)
3, V η =
1
6
sD2N\S(T − t)
3.
Proof. The result is obtained by straightforward computation using (12) and the expressions for charac-
teristic functions (20)-(23).
We can observe that the considered characteristic functions are located reflection symmetric with respect to
the bounds:
V η = V
α
,
V α = V
η
.
Moreover, it turns out that both V α and V η are aligned with respect to the bounds. It suffices to show
that only for V η, the result for V α follows from the reflection symmetry of the characteristic functions. The
following lemma formally states this result.
Proposition 4.3. For the characteristic function V η there exists a function kη(S) such that
V η(S, x(t), t) = kηV
δ(S, x(t), t) + (1− kη)V
ζ(S, x(t), t).
and this alignment coefficient is given by kη =
2DS
2DS+sDN\S
.
Proof. The result is obtained by straightforward computation using (21), (22), and (23).
Note that due to the reflective symmetry of V α and V η, the respective coefficient kα is obtained as
kα = 1− kη =
sDN\S
2DS + sDN\S
.
A remarkable property of the computed alignment coefficient kη is that it does not depend on the initial
time and the initial condition, but only on the parameters of the model.
Finally, we present an important characterization of cooperative solution (Shapley value) for the consid-
ered characteristic functions.
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Proposition 4.4. For the components of the Shapley values Shx computed on the basis of the respective
characteristic functions V x, x ∈ {α, β, ζ, η} it holds that
Shαi = Sh
δ
i = −di(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
b2i (T − t)−
1
2
BNdi(T − t)
2+
+
1
3
(
d2i +
1
4
d2j +
1
4
d2k + 1
1
3
didj + 1
1
3
didk +
1
3
djdk
)
(T − t)3,
Shζi = Sh
η
i = −di(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
b2i (T − t)−
1
2
BNdi(T − t)
2 +
1
3
DNdi(T − t)
3, i = 1, . . . , n.
For the proof of this result see Appendix 2.
Conclusion
In the paper four endogenous optimization-based characteristic functions were described and analyzed in
detail. In particular, it was shown that a new, η-characteristic function appears to be a promising candidate
for the use in various game-theoretic applications. All results were illustrated with an n player differential
game of pollution control. It was shown that for this specific game the η-characteristic function has a number
of additional important properties. The future work will be concentrated on investigating further properties
of the introduced characteristic function and its application to a wide class of dynamic games.
Appendix 1. Proofs of the theorems
Proof (Theorem 3.1). We prove the result by performing a series of transformations as shown below. At
each step, the right-hand side does not increase.
V α(S ∪Q) = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S∪Q
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈(S∪Q)
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)) (24a)
≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈(S∪Q)
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)) (24b)
≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, u
′
i, uj(u
′
i)) + min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈Q
Jk(t0, x0, u
′′
i , uj(u
′′
i )) (24c)
≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)) + min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\Q
∑
k∈Q
Jk(t0, x0, ui, uj(ui)) (24d)
≥ max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, u) + max
ui∈Ui,
i∈Q
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\Q
∑
k∈Q
Jk(t0, x0, u) (24e)
= V α(S) + V α(Q). (24f)
Here, if ui, u
′
i, and u
′′
i are not maximized upon, they are assumed to take any value from the respective set
Ui. We observe that the minimum of a sum of two functions is not less than the sum of minima of respective
functions, whence inequality (24c) follows. Note that in the latter case, the minimization is performed
separately. The transition from (24d) to (24e) is justified by the fact that (24d) is valid for all controls
ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ S in the first summand, and for all ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ Q in the second summand.
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Proof (Theorem 3.2). In proving (10) we follow the same lines as in the proof of Thm. 3.1. We have
V ζ(S ∪Q) = min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈(S∪Q)
Jk(t0, x0, u
∗
S∪Q, uN\(S∪Q)) (25a)
≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, u
∗
S∪Q, uN\(S∪Q)) + min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\(S∪Q)
∑
k∈Q
Jk(t0, x0, u
∗
S∪Q, uN\(S∪Q)) (25b)
≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\Q
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, u
∗
S , uN\S) + min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\Q
∑
k∈Q
Jk(t0, x0, u
∗
Q, uN\Q) (25c)
= V α(S) + V α(Q), (25d)
where the inequality (25c) relies on the fact that minimization over a larger set, say,
⋃
i∈N\S Ui yields a
result that does not exceed that one obtained when minimizing over
⋃
i∈N\(S∪Q) Ui.
Proof (Theorem 3.3). 1. Obviously, the maximum of a function over a set is not less than the value
obtained by picking up any element from the set and substituting it into that function. Thus, it follows
that for any S ⊆ N
V α(S) = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, uS, uN\S(uS)) ≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S, uN\S) = V
ζ(S).
2. If – in the definition of the α-characteristic function – instead of using their best response (minimizing)
strategies, the players from the complementary coalition stick to some arbitrary strategies, the outcome
will not diminish:
V δ(S) = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, uS , u
NE
N\S) ≥ max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji(uS , uN\S(uS)) = V
α(S).
3. Taken that the players from the coalition S use their best response strategies, the minimum over a set
cannot exceed the value of the payoff computed for a fixed set of strategies uNE
N\S:
V δ(S) = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, uS , u
NE
N\S) ≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, ui(uj), uj) = V
β(S)
4. This inequality is similar to the one in item 1.
V δ(S) = max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
k∈S
Jk(t0, x0, uS , u
NE
N\S) ≥
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S, u
NE
N\S) = V
η(S).
5. The minimum of a function over a set is not larger than the value obtained by picking up any element
from the set and substituting it into that function. Thus, we have
V η(S) =
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S , u
NE
N\S) ≥ min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ji(t0, x0, u
∗
S , uN\S) = V
ζ(S).
This concludes the proof.
Appendix 2. Computation of the characteristic functions and related characteristics
To compute the α-characteristic function we employ a two-step procedure. First, we solve the minimiza-
tion problem
min
uj∈Uj ,
j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
T∫
t0
(
biui −
1
2
u2i − dix
)
dt (26)
14
with respect to the players from the complementary coalition N \ S. The respective optimal controls are
found to be u¯j = bj , j ∈ N \ S. This has a straightforward interpretation. First observe that the players
are coupled only through the state variable x. As the state growth, the costs incurred grow as well. Thus
the best strategy of the complementary coalition, acting as an adversary w.r.t. the coalition S, is to emit
as much pollution as possible.
Next we consider the maximization problem
max
ui∈Ui,
i∈S
∑
i∈S
T∫
t0
(
biui −
1
2
u2i − dix
)
dt, (27)
where the controls uj , j ∈ N \S are set to their optimal values u¯j = bj. The respective optimal controls are
computed to be u¯i(t) = bi −DS(T − t), i ∈ S, and the state trajectory is
xαS(t) = x0 + (BN − sDST −DN\ST )(t− t0) +
1
2
(sDS +DN\S)(t
2 − t20), (28)
where DS =
∑
i∈S di, DN\S =
∑
i∈N\S di, and s = |S|.
Substituting the obtained expression for the state (28) and the optimal controls u¯(t) into (7) we obtain
the expression for the α-characteristic function (20).
Note that since the controls of the players from the coalition and its complement are decoupled, the
α-characteristic function coincides with the β-characteristic function for the studied problem.
The δ- (resp., ζ-) characteristic function is obtained by solving the maximization problem (27) (resp.,
minimization problem (26)), while the remaining players use precomputed strategies: the Nash equilibrium
solution in the first case and the cooperative agreement in the second case. We omit the details and only
show the expressions for the state trajectories:
xδS(t) = x0 + (BN − sDST −DN\ST )(t− t0) +
1
2
(sDS +DN\S)(t
2 − t20),
and
xζS(t) = x0 + (BN − sDNT )(t− t0) +
sDS
2
(t2 − t20).
Substituting the expressions for optimal controls and the state variable into (8) and (9) we recover the
expressions (21) and (22).
Finally, the expression for the η-characteristic function is obtained by a mere substitution of the pre-
computed strategies in the formula (11). This yields (23).
It is worth noting that the regularity assumption (15) guarantees that the optimal controls in all the
considered cases take on the values from the admissible control sets Ui = [0, bi].
Proof (Proposition 4.4). We will prove the first equality. The second one can be shown along the same
lines. For the sake of brevity, we will denote V x(S, x(t), T − t) by V x(S) for x ∈ {α, δ}.
For any coalition S ⊂ N we have
V α(S)− V α(S \ {i}) =
− di(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
b2i (T − t)−
1
2
BNdi(T − t)
2 +
1
6
(
sD2S − (s− 1)(DS − di)
2
)
(T − t)3
and
V δ(S)− V δ(S \ {i}) = −di(T − t)x(t) +
1
2
b2i (T − t)−
1
2
BNdi(T − t)
2+
+
1
6
(
2DN\SDS + sD
2
S − 2(DN −DS + di)(DS − di)− (s− 1)(DS − di)
2
)
(T − t)3.
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Thus it holds that
V δ(S)− V δ(S \ {i}) = V α(S)− V α(S \ {i}) +
1
6
(
2DN\SDS − 2(DN −DS + di)(DS − di)
)
(T − t)3.
At the next step we wish to show that for any i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ N such that i ∈ S the respective
component of the difference between two Shapley values is equal to 0:
∑
S⊂N
i∈S
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
(
2DN\SDS − 2(DN −DS + di)(DS − di)
)
(T − t)3 = 0.
(29)
We note that for any i ∈ N , the set of all subsets of N containing i can be represented as a number of pairs:
S and (N \ S) ∪ {i}, where S is an arbitrary subset of N containing i. For any S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S we
have
∑
i∈S′
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
(
2(DN −DS + di)(DS − di)− 2DN\SDS
)
(T − t)3 =
= −
∑
i∈S
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
(
2(DN −DS + di)(DS − di)− 2DN\SDS
)
(T − t)3.
This implies that the respective summands in (29) cancel thus (29) turns to zero. The second equality in
Prop. 4.4 is shown in the same way.
References
[1] Bas¸ar T (1976) On the uniqueness of the Nash solution in linear-quadratic differential games. International Journal of
Game Theory 5(2-3):65–90
[2] Bas¸ar T, Olsder GJ (1999) Dynamic noncooperative game theory, Classics in applied mathematics, vol 23, 2nd edn. SIAM
[3] Bardi M, Capuzzo-Dolcetta I (2008) Optimal control and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.
Springer
[4] Breton M, Zaccour G, Zahaf M (2005) A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects. Automatica
41(10):1737–1749
[5] Chander P, Tulkens H (1997) The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. International Journal
of Game Theory 26(3):379 – 401, DOI 10.1007/BF01263279
[6] Filar JA, Gaertner PS (1997) A regional allocation of world CO2 emission reductions. Mathematics and Computers in
Simulation 43(3–6):269–275
[7] Freiling G, Jank G, Abou-Kandil H (1996) On global existence of solutions to coupled matrix Riccati equations in closed-
loop Nash games. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 41(2):264–269
[8] Friedman A (1994) Differential games. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory with economic applications,
vol 2, Elsevier, pp 781–799
[9] Greenberg J (1994) Coalition structures. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory with economic applica-
tions, vol 2, Elsevier, pp 1306–1337
[10] Gromov D, Gromova E (2017) On a class of hybrid differential games. Dynamic games and applications 7(2):266–288
[11] Gromova E (2016) The Shapley value as a sustainable cooperative solution in differential games of three players. In: Recent
Advances in Game Theory and Applications, Springer, pp 67–89
[12] Gromova E, Malakhova A, Marova E (2017) On the superadditivity of a characteristic function in cooperative differential
games with negative externalities. In: 2017 Constructive Nonsmooth Analysis and Related Topics (dedicated to the
memory of V.F. Demyanov) (CNSA), pp 1–4, DOI 10.1109/CNSA.2017.7973963
[13] Gromova EV, Marova EV (2018) Coalition and anti-coalition interaction in cooperative differential games. IFAC-
PapersOnLine 51(32):479 – 483, DOI 10.1016/j.ifacol.2018.11.466, 17th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Opti-
mization CAO 2018
[14] Gromova EV, Petrosyan LA (2017) On an approach to constructing a characteristic function in cooperative differential
games. Automation and Remote Control 78(9):1680–1692, in Russian.
[15] Hajdukova´ J (2006) Coalition formation games: A survey. International Game Theory Review 8(4):613–641
16
[16] Hart S (1989) Shapley value. In: Eatwell J, Milgate M, Newman P (eds) Game Theory, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 210–216,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5 25
[17] Haurie A, Zaccour G (1995) Differential game models of global environmental management. In: Carraro C, Filar JA (eds)
Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 2,
Springer, pp 3–23
[18] Huang CY, Sjo¨stro¨m T (2010) The recursive core for non-superadditive games. Games 1(2):66–88
[19] Hull DG (2003) Optimal control theory for applications. Springer
[20] Jørgensen S, Gromova E (2016) Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation. Euro-
pean Journal of Operational Research 254(1):294–303
[21] Moulin H (1987) Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods. International Journal of Game Theory
16(3):161–186
[22] Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A course in game theory. MIT press
[23] Petrosjan L, Zaccour G (2003) Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction. Journal of economic
dynamics and control 27(3):381–398
[24] Petrosyan LA, Danilov NN (1979) Stability of solutions in non-zero sum differential games with transferable payoffs.
Vestnik of Leningrad University 1:52–59, in Russian.
[25] Petrosyan LA, Gromova EV (2014) Two-level cooperation in coalitional differential games. Trudy Instituta Matematiki i
Mekhaniki UrO RAN 20(3):193–203
[26] Reddy PV, Zaccour G (2016) A friendly computable characteristic function. Mathematical Social Sciences 82:18–25
[27] Roth AE (ed) (1988) The Shapley value: essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press
[28] Sedakov A (2018) Characteristic functions in a linear oligopoly TU game. In: Petrosyan LA, Mazalov VV, Zenkevich NA
(eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Game Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2017, Springer, pp 219–235
[29] Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games 2(28):307–317
[30] Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Game theory and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
[31] Winter E (2002) The Shapley value. In: Aumann R, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory with economic applications,
vol 3, Elsevier, pp 2025–2054
17
